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Chapter 6
The Dynamics of Inequality in the 
Congolese Copperbelt
A Discussion of Bourdieu’s Theory of Social Space
Benjamin Rubbers
Few Congolese people would acknowledge the existence of social classes 
in their own country. The categories that they use in everyday life (the 
‘unemployed’, ‘intellectuals’, ‘villagers’ or ‘whites’, to give but a few 
examples) are based on different criteria of classification, ambiguous and 
ill- defined; for that reason, they cannot easily be matched with social 
classes. All would however acknowledge the existence of strong inequal-
ities in Congolese society. So how can we account for these inequali-
ties and their evolution since Congo’s independence in 1960? In order 
to do so, a vast literature suggests starting from an a priori definition of 
class- in- itself (the political class, the working class, or more recently, the 
middle class), and then to study its formation, its interests, its conflicts 
and the forms of consciousness associated with it. This line of enquiry, 
however, is confronted by two longstanding issues in class analysis: to 
determine the boundaries of social classes (who belong to the class under 
study?), and to think the relationship between class- in- itself and class- for- 
itself (what is the relevance of class from people’s point of view?).
This chapter argues that to account for the evolution of inequalities 
in Congo since independence, the theoretical framework developed by 
Bourdieu in Distinction (1979) offers a better starting point. It allows one 
not only to overcome the two above- mentioned difficulties faced by tradi-
tional class analysis, but also to study the dynamics of class in a broader 
 perspective –  beyond the usual emphasis on the formation of a particular 
class. In a nutshell, Bourdieu sees ‘social classes’ as emic categories that 
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result from the re- presentation work of cultural entrepreneurs and peo-
ple’s acts of classification in everyday life. Such categories are not purely 
arbitrary: they are based on perceived discrepancies in  lifestyles –  that is, 
ways of talking, eating, dressing, and so on; and these lifestyles, just like 
the practical schemas through which they are perceived, are the product 
of certain living conditions. In a society like France, living conditions 
show deep inequalities that Bourdieu proposes to objectify (and measure) 
under the form of three species of power, or capital: economic, cultural 
and social capital. French society is thus represented not as a single hier-
archy of socio- economic classes, but as a continuous and multidimen-
sional  space –  what he calls the ‘social space’, or ‘space of social positions’.
For Bourdieu, in other words, there is no class in itself that people 
would become conscious of, and/or that the social scientist could take as 
a research subject a priori. It is people and institutions that draw sym-
bolic boundaries between social categories. At most, it is possible, on 
the basis of the distribution of the different forms of capital, to delineate 
some ‘theoretical regions’, or ‘classes on paper’, in order to account for 
probable symbolic associations and divisions between people.1 However, 
Bourdieu (1984: 4) reminds us, the symbolic association of those who 
are close in the social space (that is, in terms of economic, cultural and 
social capital) is never necessary, and the symbolic association of those 
distant never impossible. Indeed, the social space can be perceived and 
represented according to other principles of division than class, such as 
regional or national identity for instance.
Since its publication, Distinction (1979) has given rise to intense debate 
among sociologists, and stimulated further research, to the point that it 
has rapidly become the most cited book in the social sciences. The discus-
sion, however, has to a large extent been limited to France and the United 
States (see especially Lamont and Lareau 1988, Lamont 1992, Lamont 
2000, Lahire 2004, Coulangeon 2004, 2011). With few exceptions (Hilgers 
2009), Bourdieu’s theoretical framework has not sparked much interest in 
African studies. In addition, it is the prominent role that Bourdieu attrib-
utes to culture that has attracted the greatest attention. Most researchers 
have focused on the social distribution of cultural practices, and their 
implication in processes of boundary formation. By contrast, this chapter 
pays more attention to the theory of social classes found in Distinction 
(1979: chap. 2; see also Bourdieu 1984, 1993), which constitutes the foun-
dation of Bourdieu’s sociology of cultural practices. The discussion below 
will be limited to this first step of  analysis –  the mapping of the social 
space, and of the trajectories of socio- professional groups; for reasons of 
space, it will not go further into the details of consumption and boundary- 
marking practices.2
This chapter of 'Social Im/mobilities in Africa', edited by Joël Noret, is available open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to 
the support of the European Research Council (ERC) through the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation programme  
(grant agreement n° 646802). Not for resale.
134 Benjamin Rubbers
Bourdieu’s theory of social space shows two main limitations. Built 
on the analogy of the economy, it reduces things, knowledge and rela-
tionships to forms of ‘capital’, in which people ‘invest’ to make ‘profits’ 
on different ‘markets’ (Graeber 2001: chap.1). Since it conceptualizes the 
social space as structured by only three forms of capital, it fails to account 
for variations between individuals, including within the same family 
(Lahire 1995, 2004). In my view, these limitations, although important, do 
not invalidate Bourdieu’s theory to solve the problem of class analysis. As 
Passeron (1982, see also 1991) argues, the sociological mode of analysis is 
to a large extent founded on analogical reasoning, and the analogy of the 
economy  is –  within certain  limits –  analytically productive for studying 
non- economic processes like the so- called ‘inflation’ of educational titles. 
Bourdieu acknowledges that, to draw a detailed map of social positions 
and account for variations between individual trajectories, the analy-
sis should take into consideration other factors, including gender, age, 
health, religion, ethnicity, place of residence, etc. In his view, however, 
these social characteristics are related, and secondary, to the volume and 
distribution of economic, cultural and social  capital –  the most determin-
ing factors of living conditions. It is therefore legitimate (and productive) 
to take these three key variables as a basis for studying the transforma-
tions of the social space, and the trajectories of socio- professional groups 
within it.
This chapter takes Bourdieu’s theory of social space as a basis for 
reconstructing the dynamics of inequality in a society very different 
from  France –  namely the industrial and urban region of Katanga, in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo.3 After having discussed the relevance 
of thinking of this region as a social space structured by the three main 
forms of capital identified by Bourdieu, I will focus on the trajectories of 
two categories of people within this particular social space: white busi-
nessmen, whom I interviewed during my doctoral research in 2002–2004 
(Rubbers 2009), and Gécamines workers, with whom I lived in the course 
of several fieldtrips between 2006 and 2011 (Rubbers 2013). These case 
studies will provide the opportunity to compare their strategies of social 
mobility in the face of the powerful changes that have affected Katanga 
in the postcolonial period, and to reflect more broadly on the changing 
significance of economic, cultural and social capital in the structuring of 
inequalities in Africa.4
This chapter of 'Social Im/mobilities in Africa', edited by Joël Noret, is available open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to 
the support of the European Research Council (ERC) through the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation programme  
(grant agreement n° 646802). Not for resale.
A Discussion of Bourdieu’s Theory of Social Space 135
The Congolese Copperbelt as a Social Space
The choice to limit the analysis to the industrial and urban region of 
Katanga (or Congolese copperbelt) can be justified by its main character-
istic features: (a) It has been dominated throughout the twentieth century 
by a single mining company, the Union Minière du Haut- Katanga, subse-
quently nationalized and renamed as Générale des Carrières et des Mines 
(Gécamines); (b) a large number of its inhabitants have lived in town for 
several generations, and have to a large extent broken their rural ties; and 
(c) wage work has been historically important in the region; even today, 
it remains the main source of income for a significant proportion of the 
population.5 One last feature could be added to the list: the presence of a 
powerful white minority, who has played a key role in the emergence of 
regional identity politics in the colonial period. As many observers have 
noted, all this tends to make Katanga a distinctive place, closer to south-
ern Africa than the rest of Congo.
Several authors have sought to identify the classes that divide 
Congolese society on the basis of their position in the national politi-
cal economy (Nzongola 1970, Schatzberg 1980, Callaghy 1984, Young 
and Turner 1985, MacGaffey 1987). They did not necessarily agree on 
the number of classes, their boundaries, and the criteria to be taken into 
account in order to distinguish them but all assumed that Congolese soci-
ety was composed of classes, and that their relationship reflected the 
dynamics of an economy in the periphery of the capitalist system. The 
theory of social space, I think, provides analytical tools for developing a 
more complex understanding of the dynamics of inequalities in that soci-
ety: as mentioned above, it invites us to study these dynamics as resulting 
not from relations of production, but from the volume and distribution of 
three forms of capital among different socio- professional groups. Before 
retracing the trajectories of two such groups, I would like to briefly study 
variations in the relative weight of economic, cultural and social capital in 
the Congolese copperbelt since 1960.
In his theoretical statements, Bourdieu argues that building a theory 
of social classes implies breaking with the narrow economic approach 
of Marxism, which tends to reduce class to a position in relations of pro-
duction. In his study of France, however, economic capital is given the 
greatest importance: in the last instance, cultural practices are understood 
as reflecting distance/proximity with the experience of material neces-
sity. The problem is that the concept of economic capital is itself largely 
under- theorized. As Burawoy and Von Holdt argue (2012: chap. 2), the 
sociology of Bourdieu lacks a theory of capitalism that would account for 
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the accumulation of economic capital, changes in material living condi-
tions, and dynamics of inequality.6 The neo- Marxist approach advocated 
in studies on Congolese classes in the 1970s and 1980s was more satisfac-
tory in that respect (see MacGaffey 1987: chap.1).
In line with this latter approach, one can retrace the dynamics of 
inequality in Katanga since 1960 by taking as a point of departure the 
main forces shaping this region’s political economy. In the first place, 
this economy is strongly dependent on the mining industry and the fluc-
tuations of the copper price on the world market. The slow decrease of 
the copper price from 1974 to 2004 led to the bankruptcy of Gécamines, 
the decline of most industrial and commercial activities, and the general 
impoverishment of the population. During the last decade, the mining 
boom was followed by a rise in living standards, albeit quite unevenly 
across society. Secondly, the state faced an informal privatization process 
that made ‘corruption’ in the broad sense of the word into a major instru-
ment of economic capital accumulation. In such a context, opportunities 
for enrichment are closely associated with the occupation of a strategic 
position in the state apparatus and/or the possibility to benefit from the 
support of people in such a  position –  what Bourdieu (1994: 33–34) called, 
in a conference on the social space of soviet countries, ‘political capital’, 
or ‘social capital of a political type’. Finally, due to economic decline 
and state predation, Congolese people experienced an exponential rise in 
inflation that gradually eroded real wages, especially in the public sector. 
This process contributed to an unprecedented growth of informal activi-
ties in urban areas. Most people in Katanga came to participate in this 
economy, but only a few managed to make sufficient profits to develop 
their business and accumulate economic capital.
In comparison to economic capital, the concept of cultural capital, 
grounded in Bourdieu’s theory of habitus and cultural legitimacy, is more 
explicit. The theory of cultural legitimacy has been principally criticized 
for overestimating bourgeois culture’s symbolic domination over the 
whole society, and therefore ignoring the multiplicity of social identifica-
tions, and the heterogeneity of cultural tastes (Lamont and Lareau 1988, 
Grignon and Passeron 1989, Hall 1992, Lahire 2004). This critique, made 
for France and the United States, is justified for Katanga as well. Since 
the late nineteenth century, this industrial and urban region has attracted 
migrants of different backgrounds, and been subjected to various cultural 
influences. Appropriated in original ways, these influences have given 
birth to cultural practices (habits, lifestyles and forms of artistic expres-
sion) that cannot be reduced to mimicry of the whites.
I would nevertheless argue that Bourdieu’s broad argument is relevant 
for studying Katanga, where the cultural influence of colonial institutions 
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has been particularly strong and lasting. In this region, the state, large 
companies and Christian missions have successfully imposed Western 
‘modernity’ as a dominant cultural repertoire that Congolese people 
came to view as a major source of symbolic power. As Ferguson (1999: 
108) puts it, ‘it should not be obscured that, de facto, cosmopolitan styles 
in urban Africa are dominated by Western and Western- derived cultural 
forms; and that such cultural domination is hardly an accident’. Since 
independence, the cultural influence of colonization has been challenged 
by the cultural policy of the Mobutu regime; the collapse of the economy; 
the multiplication of schools, churches and media; and, more recently, 
the establishment of new mining investors. Even though the colonial ver-
sion of ‘modernity’ has been continuously challenged, it has remained 
a privileged reference order in the local economy of distinction. As the 
case studies show, symbolic struggles in this urban society can hardly be 
understood without going back to the Belgian colonial legacy and to the 
cultural influence of the ‘West’ in general.
A good indication of this is of course school education, which contin-
ues to be viewed as crucial despite the very limited number of job oppor-
tunities. In the 1960s, the education system was an important channel of 
upward social mobility. However, the rise of demand for education that 
followed rapidly caused a devaluation of the values of school degrees 
on the market, an increase in the duration of studies, and the creation of 
numerous private schools, ranked according to their location, the amount 
of registration fees, and their reputation. This is a process very similar to 
that described by Bourdieu (1979) and Passeron (1982) for France. The 
main difference lies in the fact that, in Congo, the growing dependence of 
public schools on the fees paid by parents and the concomitant multipli-
cation of private schools have completely altered the relative importance 
of cultural and economic capital in the access to recognized institutions: 
it is above all necessary to have money and/or support to get a (good) 
school education. Despite adverse conditions, the demand for school and 
university education has not declined since the 1970s (Rubbers 2003, De 
Herdt et al. 2010). The main reason for this is that to obtain an academic 
degree continues to be conceived by the majority of Congolese people as 
a source of prestige, the best means of getting a (good) job, and the most 
secure form of investment for the future of children.
Social capital is not more theorized than economic capital in the work 
of Bourdieu. Although it is mentioned in Distinction (1979), it is not used 
for mapping the French social space; the latter is only represented by a 
two- dimensional graphic. Later, Bourdieu (1980, 1986, 1994) discussed 
social capital in brief notes or passages, but only to treat it as a secondary 
variable, that allows for turning other forms of capital to good account. In 
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his view, social capital is of lesser importance in ‘advanced’  societies –  an 
unsubstantiated view that ignores variations between countries and sec-
tors of social life.
It is unclear whether Bourdieu would have regarded contemporary 
 Katanga –  an industrial and urban area for a  century –  as a fully- fledged 
‘advanced’ society or not.7 Nevertheless, as my earlier discussion of 
the role of economic and cultural capital suggests, social capital is cer-
tainly key to understand the dynamics of inequality in that society. If, 
as Bourdieu (1980: 2) claims, the concept of social capital is above all 
intended to account for cases where individuals earn a different return 
on an equivalent economic or cultural capital, then it is necessary to use 
it in most circumstances. Whether for getting a job, developing economic 
activities, or getting access to public services, personal relationships play 
a crucial  role –  albeit in different  ways –  in Katanga.
This allegedly strong influence of social capital in Katanga raises 
both methodological and theoretical difficulties. This form of power is 
of course more difficult to measure than economic or cultural capital. 
The successive household surveys carried out in Lubumbashi (the capi-
tal city of Katanga) since 1958 provide information on levels of income 
and education, but not on the size and composition of social networks 
(Benoît 1958, Houyoux and Lecoanet 1975, Bruneau and Pain 1990, Petit 
2003, Nkuku Khonde and Remon 2006). It is consequently impossible to 
precisely assess the relative weight of social capital in the (re-)production 
of inequalities in this city since 1960. Yet, if social capital is important 
(and I believe it is), then the theoretical representation of social space that 
Bourdieu proposed on the basis of the French  case –  a space divided in 
classes and class fractions, each developing a specific habitus and cultural 
 lifestyle –  needs to be made more complex. On the one hand, social capi-
tal blurs the probable effects of the economic and cultural capital inher-
ited from parents on children’s dispositions, practices and trajectories. 
On the other, it is not in any simple way determined by proximity in the 
social space or, to put it differently, correlated to the volume and distribu-
tion of economic and cultural capital. To study the dynamics of inequality 
in Katanga, we need therefore to pay more attention to the interplay of 
social capital with economic and cultural capital. This is what the two fol-
lowing case studies illustrate.
White Businessmen
In my doctoral research, I studied the trajectory of white businessmen 
who were dominating the most important economic sectors (mining, 
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import trade and construction) in the early 2000s (see Rubbers 2009). 
Even though some had migrated to central Africa after 1960, most were 
born in families of Belgian, Greek or Italian origins established in the area 
for two or three generations. They were part of a white population that 
sharply declined from 14,000 in 1960 to less than 1,500 in  2001 –  these fig-
ures are for Katanga province alone.8
White businessmen have been directly touched by the events that 
marked the postcolonial history of Congo- Zaire: the rebellions and wars 
that followed Congo’s independence, and Katanga’s secession, from 1960 
to 1963; the nationalization of foreign companies in 1973; and the looting 
of factories and shops by the army and the population in 1991. They were 
also, at a more general level, affected by the bankruptcy of Gécamines, 
the extension of the informal economy, and the growing poverty of the 
population. These changes nonetheless offered to some new opportuni-
ties in return: some small building contractors could get public contracts 
previously granted to major construction companies; some retail trad-
ers formerly established in rural areas could move into wholesale trade 
and industrial transformation in town; and some earthworks companies 
working for Gécamines managed to become the latter’s partner in joint 
venture projects and enter in the mining business. From 1960 to now, an 
ever decreasing number of European entrepreneurs succeeded to develop 
their activities on the ruins of the industrial and commercial base inher-
ited from the past.
This can be briefly illustrated by the trajectories of the two most impor-
tant businessmen in Katanga, George Forrest and Georges Psaromatis. 
In 1986, soon after he became the managing director of the Entreprise 
Générale Malta Forrest (EGMF), a family company with a long expe-
rience in the construction of buildings and roads, Forrest managed to 
obtain subcontracting contracts with Gécamines for earthworks. After the 
collapse of the state mining company in the early 1990s, however, he 
started to invest in other sectors and countries. This extraversion strat-
egy later allowed him to come back in the Congolese mining sector with 
a stronger negotiation position. From 1994 onwards, Forrest succeeded 
in attracting major companies to sign partnership agreements with both 
Gécamines and EGMF, and develop together several mining projects. In 
the early  2000s –  before the arrival of more important  investors –  EGMF 
had replaced Gécamines as the leading company in the Congolese mining 
sector. Through other companies, Forrest had also managed to develop 
operations in a dozen other sectors in Africa, Europe and the Middle East. 
The family business of the 1980s had turned into a multinational group.
Psaromatis began his career as a retailer in the small town of Kalemie. 
After the nationalization of foreign companies in 1973, he moved to 
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Lubumbashi and followed other Greek merchants in the food import 
trade. During the lootings of 1991, all of them lost the bulk of their goods. 
To face the situation, Psaromatis managed to obtain new goods on credit 
from suppliers in Southern  Africa –  many of them traders of Greek ori-
gins, with long- lasting connections to the Greek diaspora in Central 
and South Africa. Thanks to this support, he gained a position of vir-
tual monopoly, and made very high profits. In the years that followed, 
he strengthened this comparative advantage by opening a purchasing 
office in South Africa, developing his political connections, and grant-
ing goods on credit to local retailers. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, he 
also increased the number of cold- storage rooms and shops, built small 
processing units, and took over an oil distribution company. Up to the 
present day, this strategy has allowed the Greek businessman to face the 
growing competition of Indian, Chinese and South African importers.
The economic upward mobility of businessmen such as Forrest or 
Psaromatis in the postcolonial period came with a redrawing of hier-
archies within the white minority and of the boundary demarcating it 
from Congolese society. In the colonial period, most non- Belgian set-
tlers in Katanga were Italians from Piedmont, Greeks and Jews from the 
Dodecanese, or Portuguese. Generally poor with little school education, 
they were regarded with contempt by the Belgian establishment, as they 
could undermine white prestige and blur the racial order on which colo-
nial rule was founded. Inside their own communities, since they came 
from the same social milieu, migrated to Congo to make a fortune, and 
often operated in the same sector, these settlers were competing on essen-
tially economic grounds. It was not until the 1950s that the most success-
ful among them began to learn French, to put their children in Belgian 
schools, to give their daughters in marriage to Belgians, and to apply for 
Belgian citizenship.
After independence, the situation progressively reversed. With the 
departure of colonial administrators, company managers and employees, 
businessmen came to hold a dominant position in the white minority. At 
the time of my fieldwork in the early 2000s, they were not only the princi-
pal employer for Europeans living in Katanga, but also the main source of 
funding for social institutions catering to the latter (schools, hospitals, rec-
reational clubs, etc.). In these circumstances, it is no surprise that cultural 
capital has to a large extent given way to economic capital as the main 
principle of symbolic distinction among whites: it turns around houses, 
cars, mobile phones, holiday destinations, dinner invitations, parties 
and the size of domestic staff. Whereas the signals marking distinctions 
among whites were principally culturally acquired ones in the colonial 
period, they have become increasingly purchasable ones since the 1970s. 
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Access to goods and services is now deemed more important than educa-
tion or connoisseurship. In these circumstances, it is not the non- Belgian 
trader with a poor school education that is marginalized from the white 
community, but anyone unable to afford a certain living standard. Here is 
for instance the story of a Belgian university graduate, who saw his chil-
dren progressively ostracized after the family moved into a flat:
Parents don’t want their kids to come and play with ours anymore because we 
live in a flat: ‘they don’t have a garden’, ‘they don’t have a swimming pool’, 
‘they don’t want a nanny’, and so, ‘what are my kids going to do at their place, 
in a flat?’ There are not many kids who come and spend the afternoon playing 
with my daughter or my son.
This growing importance of economic capital must be understood 
in the light of white businessmen’s social background: they grew up in 
migrant communities entirely dedicated to business that gave limited 
value to schooling. It must also be understood in the light of the evolution 
of race relations. Since school and university education is now accessible 
to many Congolese people, it has lost much of its symbolic power from 
Europeans’ point of  view –  unless it is provided by expensive and exclu-
sive institutions abroad. At the same time, regardless of the sector, white 
businessmen continue to be in a dominant position, and white workers 
continue to earn much higher wages than nationals with the same quali-
fication. Only money now allows the Europeans to preserve their relative 
social rarity. Practices of social distinction are now primarily based on 
economic capital (money), not on cultural capital (school education), and 
put the great majority of Congolese people at some distance: obviously 
most Congolese people cannot afford to buy a villa, to put children in 
a consular school, to join expatriate social clubs, and to take holidays in 
Europe. This redefinition of the racial boundary has involved a tighter 
social control over whites’ own standard of living. To adopt practices 
accessible to most Congolese people is quickly subjected to disapprov-
ing comments and derogatory comments that have the effect of making 
expatriates hold their position as whites: ‘when I bought my bike here’, a 
woman who arrived from Greece in the 1990s told me, ‘the entire Greek 
community was shocked: a Greek woman cannot cycle here; she must 
move around by car because bikes are for the Blacks’.9
Whether based on economic or cultural capital, the symbolic distinc-
tion of the white community is not completely alien or illegitimate to 
Congolese people for they use similar signals to make distinctions 
among themselves, and closely associate them with whiteness. The 
tautology used in local Swahili for modernity – ‘kizungu bazungu’, lit-
erally the ‘Europeans’ European way of life’ – is a clear indication of 
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this. In accordance with this symbolic proximity between race and class, 
whites tend to be seen a priori as rich, educated and high- status. In the 
same way, Congolese people with a ‘modern’ lifestyle (rich, educated 
and high- status) can be referred to as whites (or ‘bazungu’) by the poor. 
Having said this, race is not entirely synonymous with class for it is also 
based on moral boundaries: whites are usually seen by both European 
and Congolese people as better organized and more trustworthy. In addi-
tion, it is not all white/Western culture that is regarded as more legiti-
mate or high- status. In relation to food, music, religion or family life, for 
example, Congolese people tend to have relatively autonomous cultural 
preferences. As explained above, Western culture’s symbolic domination 
should not be overestimated.
Since independence, the fall in the number of expatriates, their aggre-
gation around a limited number of institutions, and their concern to 
reproduce the colour bar contributed to their integration in a very dense 
social network. Clearly this social capital provides them with economic 
advantages: those entering active life can mobilize it to find employment, 
to take over a business, or to get goods in credit; as for those already in 
business, it gives them the opportunity to make deals with a relatively 
trustworthy partners, provided that they know their partners personally, 
and that they can exert social pressure on them. This form of trust is not 
to be neglected in a context marked by the weakness of formal institu-
tions (see Rubbers 2009). It is nevertheless a factor of secondary impor-
tance to account for white businessmen’ relative success in comparison 
to Congolese competitors. Independently of their business acumen, their 
success derives to a large extent from their privileged access to capital 
abroad: it is above all their contacts with traders or mining companies 
abroad that allowed businessmen like Forrest or Psaromatis to gain a 
dominant position in the Congolese market. In comparison, for lack of 
credibility and/or connections, Congolese businessmen have much more 
difficulties in attracting capital, or to obtaining goods on credit, from for-
eign partners.
Gécamines Workers
From 2006 to 2011, I conducted ethnographic research in Likasi with 
Gécamines workers who were made redundant from the company in 
2003–2004 within the framework of a voluntary departure programme 
(VDP) designed by the World Bank (Rubbers 2013).10 This generation of 
workers started their career at the company in the late 1950s and early 
1960s. At that time, the social policy that Union Minière had put in place 
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from the late 1920s onwards offered significant benefits to them. Provided 
that they agreed to live under the disciplinary regime in the company’s 
camps, they could take advantage of its comprehensive social infrastruc-
ture, and provide a certain material security to their wife and children 
(food, health, education, etc.). For this reason, they represented a rela-
tively protected category in Congolese society.
This generation of workers has experienced a long and progressive 
decline of its living conditions in the postcolonial period. From the 1970s 
onwards, following the decrease of copper prices, Gécamines let their 
real wages devaluate because of inflation. In the early 1990s, the com-
pany fell into bankruptcy, abandoned its social infrastructure, and ceased 
to distribute benefits to its personnel. Finally, in the context of the war 
between 1998 and 2003, workers began to receive their wages irregularly. 
In 2002, just before the VDP, they had on average thirty- six months of 
wage arrears. According to a survey conducted at that time (University of 
Lubumbashi 2005: 8–20), their standard of living was then lower than the 
rest of Katanga’s urban population. Retrospectively, the only advantage 
that they obtained from their employer to face the deterioration of their 
living conditions was the opportunity to buy back the company houses 
they occupied in the late 1980s. This property subsequently protected 
them against an even more dramatic fall.
This collective downward spiral conceals disparities between different 
categories of employees, particularly managers and workers (see Rubbers 
2017). It is therefore useful to come back in more detail to the economic, 
cultural and social strategies that they developed to face the decline of 
their living conditions. In the aftermath of independence, the company 
began to nationalize its staff.11 During a brief period, this policy was of 
most benefit to skilled workers, who could obtain a promotion in the 
company hierarchy. Subsequently Gécamines gave preference to univer-
sity and college graduates recruited externally instead. Those who could 
get access to a managerial position lived in another neighbourhood, and 
enjoyed a much higher living standard: a garden villa, a car, domestic 
workers, and so on. In a sense Gécamines did not bridge the economic, 
cultural and social gap that existed between European managers and 
Congolese workers in the colonial period. The Africanization of person-
nel simply consisted in granting to the new Congolese managers the ben-
efits formerly reserved for whites.
Following the decline of Gécamines, the social distance between 
managers and workers was put into question. The living standard of 
employees came to depend less and less on their position in the com-
pany hierarchy, and more and more on the informal activities that they 
developed on the side with their wife and children (agriculture, petty 
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trade, poultry farming, etc.). Managers often found it harder to engage 
in such activities because they were less accustomed to manual work, 
and had a social status to uphold. In the 1990s, their total income could 
be, for that reason, lower than that of workers. Managers nevertheless 
found themselves in a better position after the VDP in 2003–2004. They 
received a severance payment (between US$8,000 and 15,000), signifi-
cantly higher than that of workers (between US$2,000 and 4,000), that 
allowed them to invest in real estate. They could also move into the cot-
tage for domestic workers in their garden, and rent their own house to an 
expatriate  family –  an opportunity inaccessible to workers, who lived in 
small houses in a former work camp on the outskirts of the city.
This is the decision that Kalombo, a former Gécamines manager in 
his seventies, took after having invested in a cooperative, a bread oven, 
a small shop in front of his house, and the cultivation of a plot of land. 
Although some of these activities keep going, the income that they gen-
erate is not sufficient for Kalombo to make a living. Part of the money 
that Kalombo received as severance payment was also shared with his 
adult children to give them the opportunity to complete their studies 
and move abroad: one now practices as a doctor in Canada, and four are 
employed by private companies in South Africa. These children send him 
some money in case of emergencies, but not for ordinary expenditures. 
Consequently Kalombo and his wife decided to move in the cottage and 
to rent their house for US$700/month to an Indian family: ‘I thought that 
I should be autonomous, and to be autonomous, I had to rent the house 
and put myself in here. As I only have two dependent children now, it’s 
easier.’
As this case shows, another reason for which managers became better 
off than workers in the 2000s is that some of their children came to enjoy a 
more comfortable situation that allowed them to financially support their 
parents. Even though this support is generally small and/or irregular, it 
is critically important in difficult circumstances, whether it is for facing 
health problems, paying school fees, or recapitalizing a small business. 
The reasons that the children of managers came to enjoy a more comfort-
able situation in the 2000s are complex. Like the children of Kalombo, 
many received money from their father after the VDP to leave the coun-
try, and succeeded in getting a job or developing a business abroad. In 
addition, the children of managers were more likely than those of work-
ers to continue their education in a graduate school or at university, and 
accordingly found themselves in a more favourable position to get a job 
when new opportunities opened up in the context of the mining boom. 
To study in a higher education institution gave them access not only to 
a degree, but also to a social capital independent from the one that they 
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acquired in Gécamines’ townships. Both are of crucial importance to get a 
job in Congo (Rubbers 2003, 2004).
The children of workers did not have the same opportunities. Take 
the example of Makumbi’s children. After having repaid his debts and 
bought a field, this seventy- year- old former trainer gathered his eleven 
adult children to share the remainder of his severance payment (US$3000) 
among them. Needless to say, the amount of money that they received 
(approximatively US$100) could only be used for ordinary expenses, not 
for investing in a business or financing a trip abroad. In return, Makumbi 
asked them to assist him in the payment of school fees for the three 
remaining dependent children. Since then, however, he has not received 
anything: ‘Not even a pen or a notebook. If I had not bought this field, 
where would I be today? I have been disappointed by my children; I’m 
disappointed up to the present day.’ In their defence, it must be pointed 
out that none of his children had the opportunity to study beyond sec-
ondary school and get a stable job. All struggle to make a living in farm-
ing, small businesses or artisanal mining.
To understand this broad contrast between managers’ and work-
ers’ children, it is necessary to come back to their unequal access to the 
educational system in the heyday of Gécamines. Until the 1980s, both 
Gécamines managers and workers prepared their children to pursue a 
career in the company and, if possible, to rise in the occupational hier-
archy. The opportunities to advance to managerial positions, however, 
were profoundly unequal. Managers’ children were prepared to become 
managers too, and benefited from various advantages in order to do so: 
they had guaranteed access to the company’s secondary schools and tech-
nical colleges; they could study in their own bedroom, and did not have 
to participate to the housekeeping; and they regularly spoke French at 
home. Workers’ children did not enjoy such favourable conditions. As 
they grew up in crowded houses, they were expected to assist their par-
ents from an early age, and to start working at the end of primary school, 
or at the end of training school12 (three years). In addition, the spoken 
language at home was usually Swahili. As a result, only a minority con-
tinued their secondary and post- secondary studies, usually thanks to the 
support of some teachers.
From the 1980s onwards, however, the decline of Gécamines gradu-
ally pushed workers to encourage their children to continue their school 
education and to find employment elsewhere. This was made pos-
sible by the creation of numerous private schools in the same period. 
Although more expensive, these schools offered worker households the 
opportunity to circumvent the company’s discriminatory school system. 
Generally speaking, workers came to give increasing importance to 
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school education. Today, they consider it as the only form of ‘capital’ 
that they can pass on to their children, and the only ‘bargaining chip’ 
that they have to ask for their assistance later. Much more than that, 
they expect that school education will teach a sense of discipline, arouse 
children’s desire to progress in life, and open their mind to the modern 
world. This latter discourse on the school’s moral mission became more 
and more widespread in the 1990s and 2000s, when Gécamines workers 
began to experience growing difficulties in paying school fees. The grow-
ing number of school drop- outs in that period caused what my inform-
ants consider as a profound moral crisis. Tommy, a young man who 
worked as an artisanal miner before returning to school, explains that a 
‘wall of incomprehension’ has emerged between some school drop- outs 
and those who continue to study like him:
In the past, we could study normally, we could eat normally. If we had to eat, 
we could eat. If we had to do something for the benefit of human kind, we did 
it. But since then, with the collapse of Gécamines, all has changed really. As 
people don’t study normally, one can see young children not wanting to study: 
they prefer to look for money. Girls don’t want to resume their studies. They 
prostitute themselves. … For boys, it is bizarre too. They don’t want to hear 
about the studies. They don’t want anymore. For them, it is only about having 
money, getting drunk, that’s all. Most don’t even have a vision about becom-
ing better- off in the future. They became narrow- minded: they only look for 
something to eat, dress, and that’s all. Yet a human being must normally have 
a project so that one day, he may become someone in society. But these guys, 
what society forbids is what they do. …. They call university graduates ‘fools’: 
‘No, they can even make three months without getting anything’. They often 
say: ‘Many people have studied here but up to now, they have nothing, no 
house, nothing’. So it’s better for us to be wary. Instead of being together with 
them, it’s better to make a break. We really split. They can do what they want, 
and we also, we do what we want.
This moral crisis calls into question the norms and values inherited 
from the company since the colonial period. Within the framework of its 
stabilization policy from the 1920s onwards, the Union Minière attempted 
to instil in workers, their wives and children a whole series of norms and 
values related to the body (nutrition, conduct, dress, etc.), work (time, 
productivity, progress, etc.), and the family (monogamy, domesticity, 
savings, etc.). This cultural policy led in company townships to the emer-
gence of an economy of distinction based on the mastery of ‘modernity’, 
allowing the most educated employees to consider themselves as ‘évolués’ 
(civilized), and to look down on the ‘basses classes’ – the lowest catego-
ries of workers. Following the decline of Gécamines, it became increas-
ingly difficult for employees to participate in this economy of distinction: 
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everyone, including managers, was forced to reduce his/her living stand-
ard. The upward symbolic competition of the past even changed direc-
tion, to give place to a levelling down process through which managers 
began to imitate  workers –  to farm, to speak local Swahili, to wear second- 
hand clothes, and so on. In the 1990s, the ‘trickle- down effect’ of social 
distinction was working in reverse. Still, ‘modernity’ as a symbolic system 
continued to be struggled for, and remained a key repertoire of social 
distinction. A striking instance of this is provided by the great efforts 
that Gécamines households make during the holiday season to buy new 
clothes, decorate their homes and serve ‘European’ dishes to guests.
At the same time children dropping out from school began to elabo-
rate a lifestyle which challenged the norms and values once promoted by 
the company, the Catholic Church and the school. For many, the ‘voyou’ 
among artisanal miners is this counter- culture personified: he speaks a 
popular slang; he dresses like musicians; he spends his money on alco-
hol, drugs and prostitutes; and he overtly make fun of school gradu-
ates, church goers and even elders. This oppositional culture shows many 
similarities with that of British working- class children described by 
Willis (1978), including the rejection of school education, the importance 
of money, conspicuous consumption, the centrality of the peer group, 
an active and open sexuality, and opposition to any form of authority. 
Unlike the culture of the ‘lads’ in Britain, however, the counter- culture of 
Congolese artisanal miners does not derive from that of their fathers in 
the workplace; it has been largely developed in opposition to the norms 
and values inherited  from –  and embodied  by –  their father. It is better 
understood as a youth culture than as a working- class culture.
As such, the lifestyle of these young miners is best interpreted relation-
ally as resulting from a ‘dominated search for distinction’, that consists 
in openly claiming for oneself what is stigmatized by dominant culture 
(Bourdieu 2001: 140). In doing so, they express their deep ambivalence 
towards the ‘modernity’ to which their parents  aspired –  a culture that 
they have been taught since childhood, but to which they do not have 
access anymore. It is this ambivalence that gives their cultural practices 
a ‘postmodern’  dimension –  by which I mean here altogether posterior, 
alternative and apparently opposite to the modernity promoted by the 
company and embodied by their parents.
Secondly, contrary to the culture of British working- class children, the 
youth culture of artisanal miners does not lead them to get working- class 
jobs, and reproduce the social position of their father, but to live from a 
precarious informal activity, and experience a downward economic tra-
jectory. They not only have a lower income than their parents, but as 
they are progressively chased from the most accessible mines by foreign 
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companies, they are also condemned to give up artisanal mining sooner 
or later, and find other, less profitable, sources of income.
Thirdly, since this youth culture gives more symbolic weight to eco-
nomic than to cultural capital, it points at a progressive change in the 
legitimate forms of distinction in Gécamines townships. In these town-
ships, economic disparities have historically been low so that more 
importance was given to cultural capital. Today, most inhabitants live 
from informal activities, and new economic inequalities have emerged 
among them. Economic capital has accordingly become more salient in 
their everyday practices of distinction than in the past.
Although it is not limited to Gécamines townships, this youth culture 
is of special significance in these areas not only because it opposes the 
norms and values previously promoted by the company, but also because 
opportunities of social mobility through school education and formal 
employment have become particularly limited for Gécamines employees 
and their children. The main reason for this is that their social capital is to 
a large extent confined to the company’s social world: the Union Minière, 
and then the Gécamines, gave priority to its employees’ children and 
relatives for recruitments, built townships equipped with all the neces-
sary infrastructure to take charge of all the aspects of their existence, 
and took measures to limit, and control, their contacts with relatives and 
friends outside. This paternalistic policy led to make its employees’ social 
network limited, dense and multiplex. All my informants in Likasi had 
spent most of their life in the company’s townships. Most of their parents, 
parents- in- law, friends, neighbours, brothers and sisters in Christ, and 
so on, were also (former) Gécamines employees. And their contacts with 
more distant relatives were generally weak or even broken.
Up to the 1980s Gécamines employees could use these relations to 
obtain occasional assistance, or develop informal economic activities 
together. However, they turned out to be of limited use once all of them 
saw their means of existence decline and were left without resources. 
Later, after the VDP in 2003–2004, few Gécamines workers found new 
employment in the new companies that established in Katanga in the 
context of the mining boom. Unless the joint venture agreement stipu-
lates that they must rehire the Gécamines employees working on the site, 
foreign investors prefer to recruit young graduates from technical col-
leges and universities. As a result, it is principally through these gradu-
ates’ social networks that people get jobs in new mining companies. At 
most some ex- Gécamines employees in Likasi could get an unskilled and 
low paying job in small Asian companies thanks to the support of neigh-
bours, former colleagues, or brothers in Christ.
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Conclusion
This chapter has argued that, although Bourdieu’s theory of social space 
has limitations, it provides a fruitful starting point for studying the 
dynamics of inequality in the Congolese copperbelt over the postcolonial 
period. It needs to be adapted in order to take into consideration: (a) the 
macro processes shaping the local political economy; (b) how ‘modernity’ 
as a dominant culture form has been imposed, used and contested; and 
(c) the decisive role of social capital in individual strategies of mobil-
ity. Once the specific conditions that have presided over the formation 
of Katanga’s social space have been established, Bourdieu’s theoretical 
framework sheds new light on the trajectories of different social groups. 
It provides conceptual tools to understand how they faced the economic 
and political changes that have marked Katanga’s postcolonial history, 
and came to (re-)position themselves in relation to each other as a result 
of these changes.
This is what the two case studies on white businessmen and Gécamines 
workers aimed to illustrate. At the eve of independence in 1960, both 
groups had in common the fact that they lived in relatively closed social 
worlds and participated in an economy of symbolic distinction princi-
pally founded on ‘modern’ culture. They have however responded to the 
turmoil of the postcolonial period in different ways. Gécamines work-
ers were directly affected by the fall in copper prices and the plunder 
of the company by state authorities. To face this situation, they princi-
pally invested in informal economic activities and their children’s school 
education. By contrast, the European businessmen I met in the early 
 2000s –  that is, businessmen who had decided to stay in Congo after the 
Zairianization of foreign companies in 1973, and the looting of plants 
and shops by the army and the population in  1991 –  managed to take 
advantage of their competitors’ departure from the country, the decline 
of public companies, and the informal privatization of the state appa-
ratus. To do so they built on their relationships with economic partners 
abroad. It is principally these relationships that allowed them to adapt 
to changes, and to provide jobs and contracts to the white minority as a 
whole.
Besides their respective economic capitals, the main difference 
between the trajectories of white entrepreneurs and Gécamines workers, 
I would argue, has depended on their social capital. Gécamines work-
ers’ social capital has remained very much confined to the Gécamines 
community, which has been collectively confronted with a dramatic 
decline of its living conditions. It has accordingly tended to limit their 
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investments’ profitability in economic and/or cultural capital, unless they 
had the opportunity to send their children abroad. In contrast, white 
businessmen’s transnational network gave them the opportunity to gain 
market shares in the most profitable sectors of the local economy, and in 
so doing, allowed the white community to reproduce itself as a profit-
able social capital for its members. The importance of this form of capital 
should not be a surprise to students of Africa. However, the challenge is 
to understand how it works for various social groups within the same 
social space, and what effects it tends to produce on the structure of social 
inequalities. These are issues that researchers have rarely addressed since 
the pioneering work of the Rhodes Livingstone Institute.
From a more general perspective, although the trajectories of white 
businessmen and Gécamines workers in the postcolonial period took 
different  directions –  upward for the former, downward for the  latter – 
 in both groups economic capital has tended to gain in symbolic signifi-
cance while cultural capital was increasingly put into question. This 
tendency must be understood in the light of the profound changes that 
have affected the educational system, the job market and the economy 
in Congo since independence. Since a similar change may be observed in 
other places around the world (see Piketty 2013), however, it may viewed 
as part of a more global transformation, to be associated with the rise of 
neoliberalism in a labour- surplus economy (Ferguson 2015).
How economic, cultural and social capital interrelate with other factors 
of inequality, and how processes of identity formation are influenced by 
the distribution of these different factors, deserves more research. On the 
basis of research in the Congolese copperbelt, this chapter has attempted 
to show that Bourdieu’s theory of social space could nevertheless pro-
vide a relevant framework for studying the dynamics of inequality in 
Africa from a new vantage point: it offers a solution to the old problem 
of defining class boundaries; it invites us to understand class inequali-
ties relationally, in their broader social context, beyond a narrow focus 
on individual life courses, or the formation of a single social class; and it 
provides tools for understanding the social conditions of people’s subjec-
tive experience, and the larger power dynamics underlying it, without 
making of this experience the simple reflection of class position. This 
is an important challenge for anthropological research in Africa, where 
numerous studies in the last two decades have tended to give a phenom-
enological account of a (very) limited number of people’s experience, 
to emphasize fragmentation and movement, and to gloss over everyday 
life in entire cities, regions or countries (Rubbers 2017). Partly developed 
on the basis of a critique of phenomenology, Bourdieu’s theory of social 
space provides a good place from which to start paying more attention to 
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living conditions, differences in social trajectories, and broader dynamics 
of inequality again.
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Notes
 1. According to Lamont (1992), however, the three ‘theoretical’  classes –  dominant, 
middle and  popular –  distinguished by Bourdieu are based on an a priori definition, 
not on inductive analysis. In support of this critique, they are presented in numerous 
passages of his work as classes- in- themselves. So, even though the theoretical frame-
work developed by Bourdieu in Distinction offers a way to overcome the classical prob-
lems of class analysis, these problems are not entirely resolved in his empirical study of 
France.
 2. This analytical choice is justified by the concern to not take the primacy of cultural 
capital over economic and social capital for granted. The work of M. Lamont (1992, 
2000) suggests that cultural capital in the United States is less important than in France, 
and takes a different form. As Coulangeon (2004: 78; 2011) points out, the weight 
that Bourdieu himself gives to cultural capital in French society is the product of a 
given context: the ‘thirty glorious years’ that followed World War II, during which 
France experienced a reduction in income inequalities. Since the 1980s, this trend has 
reversed, and economic capital has become an increasingly salient factor of social strat-
ification again. In a sense, these studies invite us to come back to Bourdieu’s theory 
of social space (the first step of his analytical methodology) so as to better take into 
consideration the relative weight of different forms of capital in the (re-)production of 
inequalities and the trajectories of socio- professional groups.
 3. In 2015, Katanga was divided in four smaller provinces. For reasons of convenience, 
however, I will continue to refer to Katanga below.
 4. This chapter expands some of the theoretical directions behind the WORKINMINING 
research project ‘Reinventing Paternalism: The Micropolitics of Work in the Mining 
Companies of Central Africa’ (www.workinmining.ulg.ac.be). Led by the author, 
this project received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the 
European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agree-
ment n° 646802). The ideas developed in this chapter reflect only the author’s view. 
The ERC is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it 
contains.
 5. In a survey of 13,832 households in Lubumbashi in 2002, 42 per cent of respondents 
declared wage work as their main source of income (Nkuku Khonde and Remon 2006: 
60). Today, this percentage is certainly much higher since the mining boom has caused 
a strong rise in employment and wages between 2004 and 2015. 
 6. To be more precise, Bourdieu (2000, 2003) proposes a culturalist theory of capital-
ism that associates it with a specific habitus founded on calculation. At no time does 
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he goes back on the historical conditions that would account for the emergence of 
the ‘worldview’ conveyed by this habitus; he assumes that in the economic field of 
‘advanced’ societies, this habitus functions more or less in accordance with the logic of 
homo economicus. Hence his theory of capitalism supports the idea of a cultural divide 
between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ societies, and acknowledges the relevance of con-
ventional economics for the latter. From an anthropological perspective, it is for that 
reason highly questionable.
 7. As mentioned above, Bourdieu postulates a cultural divide between ‘advanced’ and 
‘traditional’ societies. Perhaps he would have compared Katanga to colonial Algeria in 
the 1950s, and considered it as a society subjected to the devastating effects of colonial-
ism? In his article ‘La hantise du chômage chez l’ouvrier algérien’ (1962), he stresses 
the role of personal contacts for Algerian urban workers in their search for employ-
ment. It is however impossible to draw from this a general argument about the relative 
weight of social capital in (post)colonial societies.
 8. Since then, Katanga witnessed a mining boom, and the foreign population rose again. 
This recent development is not discussed here. 
 9. Interestingly, this social control is situational. When expatriates go back to Europe, it 
loses much of its significance. There, they have a much more relaxed lifestyle: they may 
walk, eat African food, and even mix with the Congolese.
10. This programme involved 10,000 employees out of a total of 24,000.
11. In 1965, the Union Minière employed 229 Congolese managers out of a total of 2,247 
managers; in 1974, 1,135 out of 2,497; and in 1980, 2261 out of 3220 (Young and Turner 
1985: 107). In 1990, there were only 247 expatriate managers remaining, mostly at 
retirement age.
12. ‘Training school’ is the translation of ‘école préprofessionnelle’, a school that provides 
basic technical training during three years after primary school.
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